Skhirat Libya Political Agreement

The Council should oppose the initiative of politicians, including within its ranks, to ignore the HoR vote of August 2016. [fn] Interviews of the Crisis Group, Council member, Western diplomat, UN official, Tunis, September 2016. Those who have taken this position believe that Saleh`s objective is to buy time to further undermine the Council. U.S. diplomats, in particular, accused him of lying and failing to keep his promises on several occasions. Crisis Group interviews, Tunis, 2 September 2016. This position also has support for the High Council of State in Tripoli: on 21 September 2016, some members asked the Presidency Council and the UN to ignore the HoR and support a new government, approved exclusively by the High Council of State, which boycotted the HoR members who support the agreement. In a televised address that day on behalf of the Council, a member, Mohamed Muazzab, called on UNSMIL to “continue the implementation of the Libyan political agreement and not to associate it with the agreement of the President of the HoR, which is sanctioned only by certain countries and opposes the agreement and its results”. He also called for “the opposition minority of certain HoR members who are obstructing the agreement to be ignored.” Accompanying him on the show were the High Council of State Swehli and his deputy, Salah Makhzoum.Hide Footnote Such a line would widen the gap and trigger more military confrontation. Even some opponents of the HoR believe that it is necessary to involve them in order to maintain the coherence of the framework of the agreement and, more broadly, national unity. [fn] The member of the Presidency Council, Musa al-Koni, who said he did not confide in the leaders of the HoR, acknowledged the need to attract at least 30 members from the East and said he supported a cabinet reshuffle to this end. Interview of the Crisis Group, Tunis, 2 September 2016.Hide Footnote This more accommodating line would also return the ball to the hoR court and actually call his bluff; In particular, the Presidency Council, whose legitimacy is based on the creation of the agreement, should not depart from its obligation to agree to obtain the support of the HoR. Although all these concerns were justified, especially for neighbouring countries and other jihadist groups threatened by Daesh, as well as for Europe, where the refugee crisis had become a political and political priority, they were not enough to convince Libyan military actors to support the agreement and the Presidency of the Council.

After being in denial for much of 2015, Libyans have been concerned about the growth of IS, especially when increasingly deadly attacks have begun outside Sirte and threatened to expand eastward to critical oil installations. [fn] On January 4, 2016, at least 50 people were killed when an ISIS supporter detonated a truck at a military training ground in Zliten, 180 km west of Tripoli, Libya`s deadliest attack since 2011. This month, IS supporters also attacked checkpoints around Sidra and Ras Lanuf, east of Sirte, where major crude oil export terminals are located. Crisis Group Telephone Interviews, Residents of Ben Jawwad and Sidra, January 2016.Hide Footnote However, several major military factions have stayed away and have shown little interest in cooperating against Daesh. Of course, a political dialogue between Libyans is essential. However, the peaceful must be its priority objective, in addition to the pacification of the country, the economic recovery and the revival of society. This dialogue must be open, inclusive and honest. This dialogue must also involve important political leaders, the army, representatives of the regions of the country and the tribes, at least the most important. In its current form, the 2015 political agreement and the resulting national unity government are not the appropriate instruments to resolve the crisis and ensure the success of the democratic transition.

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